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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN OKLAHOMA
CIVIL APPELLATE PROCEDURE*
Charles W. Adamst and J. Michael Medinat
"The right of appeal is fundamentally guaranteed only to those who
comply with the procedure prescribed therefor."'
In recent years, the Oklahoma Legislature has streamlined and sim-
plified the pleading2 , discovery3, and evidence4 facets of the civil proce-
dure system.' However, until last year the law governing judgments and
appeals remained substantially untouched.6 Now this area is undergoing
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1. Meek v. Williams, 441 P.2d 420, 423 (Okla. 1968). A word of caution: the following dis-
cussion refers to a number of unpublished orders and decisions of the Oklahoma Supreme Court and
Courts of Appeal as illustrations. These unpublished orders are without precedential value, except
in cases of res judicata, collateral estoppel or law of the case. Rule 1.2000 B(E) of the Rules of
Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases. Indeed, even if published, opinions of the Court of Appeal have
only persuasive value unless they are specifically approved for publication by the Supreme Court.
Rule 1.200 C(B). See eg., Willow Creek Condominiums Second, Inc. v. Andreyev, 798 P.2d 648
(Okla. Ct. App. 1990). This precedential policy is apparently unique to Oklahoma. Mattis &
Yalowitz, Stare Decisis Among [SIC] the Appellate Courts of Illinois, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. 571,
596-97 (1979).
2. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 2001-2027 (1991).
3. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 3201-3237 (1991).
4. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 2101-3103 (1991).
5. For a criticism of the rush of many states (Oklahoma included) toward uniformity though
adoption of Federal Rules, see Graham, State Adaptation of the Federal Rulesr The Pros and Cons,
43 OKLA. L. REV. 293 (1990).
6. In the past few years several commentators have criticized particular aspects of Oklahoma's
civil appellate system. See Holladay, Appellate Jurisdiction in Cases Involving Multiple Claims, 60
OKLA. B.J. 3227, 3225 (1989) ("Oklahoma's adoption of a counterpart to Rule 54(b), Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, would go a long way toward injecting some needed certainty into Oklahoma
appellate procedure."); Medina, Pitfalls in Oklahoma Civil Appellate Practice, 57 OKLA. B.J. 741,
741 (1986) ("Oklahoma appellate law, because of its unique structural posture, presents many poten-
tial traps lurking to snare inexperienced (or even experienced) lawyers."); Note, Procedure: Effect of
Attorney Fees on Finality of Judgment - Amendment to Rule 1.11(c), 40 OKLA. L. Rv. 145, 145
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dramatic change.
In 1990 the Oklahoma Legislature passed the Oklahoma Judgments
and Appeals Act (the "Act"),7 which was a comprehensive revision of
the statutes governing the preparation of judgments and the filing of ap-
peals in civil cases. That Act has now been substantially repealed' and
the Oklahoma Statutes that existed before its enactment have been re-
stored,9 thereby returning the Oklahoma law governing judgments and
appeals to approximately what it was before the Act was passed. 10 How-
ever, before the Oklahoma Legislature repealed the Act, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court made a number of revisions to its Rules of Appellate
Procedure in Civil Cases to conform to the Act. Because the Rules of
Appellate Procedure have not been amended since the Act was repealed,
there are some inconsistencies between the Rules and the present stat-
utes. In addition, despite the repeal of most of the Act, three of its key
provisions were preserved: two of them in newly adopted section 990A
and the other in section 1006 of title 12.
At the same time that the Oklahoma Legislature repealed the Act, it
established a Joint Interim Committee and an Interim Advisory Com-
mittee on Judgments and Post-Judgment Procedure to prepare draft leg-
islation to streamline and clarify the procedures for the rendition of
judgment and appeals in civil cases.12 Thus, although most of the former
Oklahoma law has been restored for the time being, further changes to
(1987) ("Despite an unprecedented triple revision of its rules by the Oklahoma Supreme Court, there
continues to be a serious question on the most fundamental level of appellate procedure. When must
a petition in error be filed with the Oklahoma Supreme Court for it to be timely where the trial court
has decided all substantive issues raised in an action other than the issue of attorney's fees?"). The
Oklahoma Judgments and Appeals Act, infra note 7, addressed a number of the problems noted by
these commentators.
7. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 1001-1008 (Supp. 1990) (repealed 1991). The Act was to apply to
all judgments and appealable orders rendered on and after January 1, 1991. For legislative history
pertaining to the Act, see Tawwater, The Proposed Appellate Procedures Act, (OBA/CLE Seminar,
Oct. 26, 1990); Wallace, The Legislati'e History of the New Act on Judgment and Appeals, (OBA/
CLE Seminar, Oct. 26, 1990).
8. 1991 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 1761, 1769 (West).
9. 1991 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 1761, 1761-69 (West). For a useful disposition table summariz-
ing the revisions to the statutes, see Ellis, The 1991 Repeal of the 1990 Judgments and Appeals Act,
62 OKLA. B.J. 2793 (1991).
10. The statutes governing appellate procedure are found at OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 941-993
(1991). (
11. These Rules appear at OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, ch. 15, app. 1 (1991). The Oklahoma Supreme
Court has also promulgated the Rules of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, id. app. 1, and the Rules
on Practice and Procedure in the Court of Appeals and on Certiorari to That Court, Id. app. 3. In
addition, some of the Rules for District Courts of Oklahoma, id. ch. 2, app. I (e.g., Rule 17 on
motions for new trial), may affect appellate procedure.
12. S. Con. Res. 20, 1991 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. A-2 (,Vest).
[Vol. 26:489
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accomplish what were the basic objectives of the Act are likely to be
forthcoming from the Oklahoma Legislature.
This Article is divided into two parts. The first part discusses the
recent statutory changes concerning judgments and appeals in Oklahoma
state courts. It examines the repealed Act and the three of its provisions
that have been preserved. It also recommends some changes to clarify
and simplify the law of judgments and appeals for Oklahoma state
courts. The second part discusses recent judicial developments in this
area.
I. STATUTORY CHANGES
A. The Oklahoma Judgments and Appeals Act
The major objective of the Act was to clarify the timing for filing
appeals from judgments and appealable orders in Oklahoma state courts.
This was to be accomplished by tying finality to the preparation and fil-
ing with the district court clerk of a written judgment signed by the
judge, instead of to the judge's oral pronouncement of the decision. Not
only the timing of finality but also the terms of the judgment would be
clarified by the requirement of a writing. 3
Making filing a prerequisite to finality could have the unwelcome
side effect of delaying finality, particularly if one of the parties were dis-
posed to delay approval of a judgment in order to avoid its enforcement
or to put off the deadline for appeal. Section 1001 in the Act14 attempted
to alleviate this problem by encouraging trial judges to prepare and sign
judgments themselves where this was feasible, and where it was not, by
specifying a procedure for the prompt preparation of judgments by the
attorneys. Section 1001 also specified simple forms for judgments. To
assure that the parties received notice of a judgment's filing, section 1002
required a file-stamped copy of the judgment to be mailed to them, unless
the judgment was signed in their presence.
The Act also included provisions dealing with the awarding of costs,
attorney's fees, and interest on judgments. Section 1001 stated that these
items of ancillary relief could be included in a judgment, but their ab-
sence would not prevent the judgment from becoming final. Section 1003
specified a deadline of thirty days from the filing of the judgment for a
party seeking costs, attorney's fees, or interest to apply to have them
awarded. The deadlines for filing post-trial motions and appeals would
13. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1001 Committee Comments (West Supp. 1990) ("[Iln a
sense this Act constitutes a statute of frauds for judgments."). Id.
14: OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1001 (Supp. 1990) (repealed 1991).
1991]
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have begun to run with the filing of a judgment. Section 1004 set out the
general rule that an appeal from a judgment was commenced by the filing
of a petition in error with the Oklahoma Supreme Court within thirty
days after the filing of the judgment with the district court clerk. This
general rule was qualified in a variety of circumstances and for a variety
of reasons. The time for an appellant to file a petition in error was ex-
tended if section 1002 required a fie-stamped copy of the judgment to be
mailed to the appellant and the records did not reflect the mailing. In
addition, if a motion for new trial or judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict was filed within ten days after the filing of the judgment, the time to
appeal would not begin to run until the trial court's ruling on the post-
trial motion was filed with the district court clerk.
Section 1004 also had savings provisions to handle the problem of
premature appeals. A premature appeal could result from the filing of a
petition in error either before the judgment was fied with the court clerk
or while a post-trial motion was still pending. A premature appeal was
subject to dismissal under the Act, but if an appeal was dismissed on
account of being premature, the savings provisions would allow a new
appeal to be filed within thirty days after the appellant was sent notice of
the dismissal.
With respect to the commencement of appeals, section 1004 pro-
vided that a petition in error was timely if it was mailed to the Oklahoma
Supreme Court within the thirty day deadline after the filing of the judg-
ment. Under prior Oklahoma law, a petition in error had to be received
by the Oklahoma Supreme Court within the thirty day time limit in or-
der to be timely.
Section 1006 dealt with appeals in cases involving multiple claims or
multiple parties and was another important provision governing the tim-
ing of appeals. The general rule was that the time to appeal would not
begin to run until a judgment determining all the claims brought by and
against all the parties was filed with the court clerk. The general rule
was subject to the exception, though, that the trial court could expressly
direct the filing of a judgment with respect to less than all the claims and
parties, and if that was done, the time to appeal as to those claims and
parties would start to run upon the filing of that judgment.
Section 1004 also governed the timing of appeals from appealable
orders, both interlocutory and final orders. Final orders were treated as
judgments under section 1001(A), and so the time limits on appeals from
judgments would apply to them. Final orders were those that terminated
[Vol. 26:489
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a case and included denials of motions for new trial or to vacate a judg-
ment and orders granting or denying -a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict. Appealable interlocutory orders included orders involving pro-
visional remedies such as temporary injunctions and attachments, orders
granting new trials, and orders certifying or refusing to certify class ac-
tions. The appealable interlocutory orders would not necessarily be filed
with the district court clerk when they were issued, and so section 1004
specified that the time to appeal from an interlocutory order started to
run on the date the order was mailed to the appellant, or if all parties
were present at the hearing where the order was issued, on the date of the
hearing.
Section 1007 collected a number of statutory provisions dealing with
stays of execution of judgments while a case was on appeal. It codified
prior case law that made money judgments subject to an automatic ten
day stay of execution,15 and it provided for a further stay while various
post-trial motions were pending before the trial court. Section 1007 also
set out the procedure for filing a supersedeas bond or cash deposit to stay
a money judgment during the appeal, and it authorized the trial court to
grant discretionary stays of non-money judgments.
The final section of the Act, section 1008, provided the Oklahoma
appellate courts with authority to dismiss frivolous appeals and impose
sanctions on appellants and their attorneys who filed them.
B. Current Oklahoma Law
When the Act went into effect, Oklahoma judges, attorneys, and
court clerks attempted to adjust to its changes. The greatest source of
difficulty appeared to be the requirement that judgments had to "con-
form substantially" to the judgment forms. These judgment forms were
designed primarily for money judgments, and some attorneys who han-
dled foreclosures and probate proceedings were dissatisfied because the
judgment forms did not cover their cases.
Instead of modifying those specific statutes that required the judg-
ment forms to be used, the Oklahoma Legislature responded to com-
plaints about the judgment forms by repealing the Act almost entirely
and re-enacting the prior Oklahoma Statutes. Thus, it eliminated the
procedures for the preparation of judgments and the award of costs, at-
torney's fees, and interest, the savings provision for premature appeals,
the temporary automatic stay for money judgments, and the sanctioning
15. See Mapeo, Inc. v. Means, 538 P.2d 593 (Okla. 1975).
19911
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authority for appellate courts. What remains of the Act are its provi-
sions that: 1) measure the time to appeal from the date of filing of the
judgment, 2) allow the filing of civil appeals by certified mail, and 3) gov-
ern appeals in actions with multiple claims or parties. Limited as the
surviving portions are, they nevertheless represent significant improve-
ments in Oklahoma's appellate system.
1. Triggering of the Appeal
New section 990A of title 12 retains a substantial change made by
the Act: the filing of a judgment is a precondition to its appealability.
Under prior Oklahoma law, a judgment was appealable as soon as it was
pronounced.16 The prior rule created some confusion for attorneys,
particularly where the judge's pronouncement was accompanied by a
direction for the preparation of a journal entry of judgment by the attor-
ney for the prevailing party. 7 Section 990A sets out the new rule that
"an appeal to the Supreme Court may be commenced by filing a petition
in error... within thirty (30) days from the date the final order or judg-
ment is filed."'" However, the change is an incomplete one because un-
like in the original Act, 9 there are no procedures for the preparation and
16. Grant Square Bank & Trust Co. v. Werner, 782 P.2d 109, 111 (Okla. 1989) ("[IThe time for
bringing review does not begin to run from the day an appealable decision is memorialized, but
rather from its effective pronouncement .... ); Carr v. Braswell, 772 P.2d 915, 917 (Okla. 1989)
("mhe time to commence an appeal from [an order granting a summary judgment] began to run the
day the order was pronounced from the bench and communicated to the parties."); Presbyterian
Hosp. Inc. v. Board of Tax-Roll Corrections, 693 P.2d 611, 614 (Okla. 1984) ("[A]n appellant can-
not extend his time limit for appeal by refusing to approve the form of the journal entry, after
judgment has been rendered and notice given to the parties."); Warehouse Mkt., Inc. v. Berry, 459
P.2d 853, 854 (Okla. 1969) (thirty day period for filing appeal began to run when the trial court's
decision was pronounced, rather than when the journal entry was filed); Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co.
v. McBroom, 526 P.2d 509, 511 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974) (dismissing an appeal as untimely that was
filed within 30 days of the filing of the journal entry but more than 30 days from the date of the jury
verdict) (Approved for Publication by the Oklahoma Supreme Court).
17. Miller v. Miller, 664 P.2d 1032, 1034 (Okla. 1983) ("A recital in the clerk's minute that 'the
court renders judgment for the defendants per journal entry to be filed' does not constitute a judg-
ment where the trial court's judgment does not appear in the record."); Shaw v. Sturgeon, 304 P.2d
341, 343 (Okla. 1956) (court's statement directing parties to prepare journal entry was not suffi-
ciently explicit to qualify as a judgment); News-Dispatch Printing & Audit Co. v. Board of
Comm'rs, 132 Okla. 216, 217, 270 P. 2, 3 (1928) (minute entry reflecting that the court rendered
judgment for the defendants "as per journal entry to be filed" did not constitute a judgment). See
also Medina, supra note 6, at 746 n. 12 (1986); Morgan, Delayed Attacks on Final Judgments, 33
OKLA. L. REv. 45, 45 n. 1 (1980) ("A judgment is rendered whenever the judge indicates a present
intention to adjudicate the matter. Since no particular form is required there is sometimes uncer-
tainty as to exactly when a judgment is pronounced.").
18. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 990A (1991). But see Jaco Prod. Co. v. Luca, 62 OKLA. B.J. 3544
(Okla. 1991) (appeal time begins to run when jury verdict is entered by the clerk, not when journal
entry of judgment is filed).
19. See OKLA STAT. tit. 12, § 1001 (Supp. 1990), (repealed 1991). But see, McCullough v.
6
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 26 [1990], Iss. 4, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol26/iss4/2
CIVIL APPELLATE PROCEDURE
filing of judgments and for appropriate notice to counsel. Furthermore,
unlike the provisions of the original Act, no specific exclusion from the
definition of judgment is provided for letters from the court directing the
preparation of an order.20
In addition, section 990A deals only with the triggering of the time
to appeal. It does not affect the time when the judgment becomes en-
forceable. Under the prior Oklahoma law, a judgment was effective as
soon as it was pronounced, and this appears now to be the rule for
Oklahoma state court judgments. Moreover, the time for filing post-trial
motions remains tied to the time of rendition, rather than the filing of the
judgment.21
2. Filing of Appeal by Certified Mail
Another change made by section 990A is its provision for the filing
of petitions in error by certified mail with return receipt requested.22 The
need for this change is illustrated by the result in Turrell v. Continental
Oil Co..23 The Oklahoma Supreme Court dismissed the appeal in Turrell
on the ground that it was not timely filed, where the appellant mailed the
petition in error from Tulsa on the Friday before the filing deadline on
Monday, and the petition in error was not delivered to the Supreme
Court until Tuesday. The Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled: "[m]ailing a
petition in error in a cover addressed to the clerk of this court, postage
prepaid, within time believed to be required for delivery does not consti-
tute compliance with [section] 990.1124 Thus, under Turrell, an appellant
Safeway Stores, Inc. 626 P.2d 1332, 1335 (Okla. 1981) (where the trial court took a motion for
summary judgment under advisement, the appellant was allowed 30 days from the time of the mail-
ing of notice that the trial court had granted summary judgment in which to file an appeal), cited
with approval on this point, Pope v. Tulsa Professional Collection Serv., Inc., 808 P.2d 640, 644
(Okla. 1991). Rule 1.11(a) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases confirms this rule.
However, a strict reading of the new legislation, supra n.17, creates a conflict with the rule. The new
legislation measures the appeal time from the filing of the judgment or final order. As has been
suggested, Ellis supra n.9, the safest course is to cover all possibilities, and, if need be, file multiple
appeals. For a recent illustration of the benefits of filing multiple petitions in error, see In re Goodly,
62 OKLA. B.J. 3018, 3019 (Okla. Ct. App. 1991).
20. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1001(E) (Supp. 1990) (repealed 1991).
21. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 653, 698 (1991). In addition, a potential conflict exists between
§ 653, prescribing the 10 day period to run from rendition of the judgment and Rule 1.12(c)(1),
which provides that the period commences on the filing of the judgment.
22. Besides filing the petition in error with the Oklahoma Supreme Court, an appellant must
also file a copy with the trial court and mail a copy to all other parties to the appeal or their counsel.
Rule 1.14(b) of the Oklahoma Rules of Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases. Timely filing of the
petition in error is jurisdictional. See Rule 1.14(c).
23. 466 P.2d 643 (Okla. 1970).
24. 466 P.2d at 644. See also Burk v. Burk, 516 P.2d 268 (Okla. 1973) (affirming denial of
motion to vacate that was based on the failure of the Postal Service to deliver petition in error within
1991]
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who mailed a petition in error to the Oklahoma Supreme Court took the
risk of late delivery by the post office, which would cause the appeal to be
dismissed as untimely.z5 Consequently, attorneys for appellants who
wished to file petitions in error toward the end of the appeal period and
who wanted to avoid exposure for malpractice had to incur the expense
of utilizing means other than the mail for delivering petitions in error to
the Oklahoma Supreme Court.26
Section 990A changes the rule of the Turrell case by providing that
the date of mailing a petition in error is deemed to be the date of its filing
with the Oklahoma Supreme Court, so that an appeal will be timely if the
petition in error is mailed within thirty days from the filing of the judg-
ment with the court clerk.27 Section 990A further provides that the date
of mailing will be established from the postmark or other proof from the
post office. It should be noted, however, that unless the petition in error
is sent by certified mail with return receipt requested, the filing will not
be effective until the petition in error is received by the Oklahoma
Supreme Court.28 In addition, the proof of mailing must be supplied by
the post office; a record from a private postal meter is not effective to
establish the date of mailing. 29 An appellant who does not want to have
to rely on the Oklahoma Supreme Court's making a record of the date of
the postmark or its preserving the envelope in which the petition in error
the 30 day period for a prior appeal); In re Dalzell, 813 P.2d 537 (Okla. Ct. App. 1991) (appeal
dismissed; mailing rule not retroactive, thus Turrell rule applicable).
25. For examples of cases dismissing appeals as untimely, see e.g., Carr v.Braswell, 772 P.2d
915 (Okla. 1989); Grant Square Bank & Trust Co. v. Werner, 782 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1989). In Fields
v. A & B Electronics, 788 P.2d 940 (Okla. 1990), however, the court saved an appeal from the
Workers' Compensation Court by taking judicial notice that (unknown to appellant), the court
clerk's office was closed early on the final day of the jurisdictional period.
26. See Medina, supra note 6, at 746 n. 10 (1986) (recommending at least a one day safety
margin for transmitting a petition in error to the Oklahoma Supreme Court).
27. The address for mailing prescribed in Rule 1.15(a) of the Oklahoma Rules of Appellate
Procedure in Civil Cases is: Clerk of the Supreme Court, Room 1, State Capitol Bldg., Oklahoma
City, Oklahoma 73105.
28. Rule 1.15(a) of the Oklahoma Rules of Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases provides in
pertinent part: "A petition in error mailed by U.S. mail, other than return receipt requested, or
private express or delivered by courier will be deemed filed upon date of receipt by the Clerk."
29. Rule 1.15(a) of the Oklahoma Rules of Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases provides in
pertinent part: "A postmark date from a privately owned postage meter will not suffice as proof of
the date of mailing and will be deemed filed upon date of receipt by the Clerk." The Clerk of the
Appellate Courts has announced that for the filing of a petition in error by mail to be effective, it
must be sent by certified mail with return receipt requested and be postmarked by the Post Office,
rather than with a private postage meter. Notice to Attorneys, 62 OKLA. B.J. 252 (1991).
[Vol. 26:489
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is mailed should obtain a sender's receipt from a postal employee show-
ing the date of mailing.30
The clerk of the Supreme Court formerly accepted petitions in error
for filing at his residence in order to provide attorneys with additional
time for filing petitions in error. Since section 990(A) now permits filing
by certified mail, the Clerk has discontinued this practice.31
The filing by mail provision in section 990A applies only to the filing
of petitions in error. Briefs, motions and other documents continue to be
deemed filed only when actually filed at the Clerk's office.32 Further-
more, the extra time authorized by title 12, section 2006(D) of the
Oklahoma Statutes33 for a party to respond after being served by mail
does not apply to appellate proceedings.34
3. Judgments in Cases with Multiple Claims or Parties
The only portion of the Act itself that was not repealed is section
1006 of title 12, which deals with cases involving multiple claims or par-
ties. The joinder of multiple claims and parties in a single action is au-
thorized by various sections of the Oklahoma Pleading Code.35 If a trial
court decides some, but less than all, of several claims asserted in a case,
is the court's decision immediately effective and appealable, or must all
the claims asserted by and against all the parties be decided before there
is a final judgment that is effective and appealable?
The prior Oklahoma law on this question was confusing and uncer-
tain.3 6 If a case involved multiple parties and a trial court's ruling had
30. See United States Postal Service, Domestic Mail Manual § 912.44(d) (1990) (sender of cer-
tified mail may obtain a receipt from the post office showing the time an article is accepted for
mailing).
31. See Rule 1.15(a) of the Oklahoma Rules of Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases, which pro-
vides in part:
Effective March 1, 1991, when a petition in error is delivered to the Clerk for filing it must
be delivered at the Office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court during regular office hours,
Monday through Friday between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., holidays excluded, at the State
Capitol.
Id.
32. Rule 1.15(c) of the Oklahoma Rules of Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases provides: "All
briefs, pleadings, motions, petitions for rehearing, and petitions for certiorari to the Court of Appeals
are deemed filed on date of receipt of the Clerk of the Supreme Court."
33. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2006(D) (1991).
34. Rule 1.1(b) of the Oklahoma Rules of Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases provides: "The
additional time of three (3) days granted by 12 O.S. Supp. 1985 § 2006(D) is not applicable to the
time periods described in these rules."
35. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 2013, 2015, 2018-2020, 2022, 2024 (1991).
36. Mann v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 669 P.2d 768, 770 (Okla. 1983) ("The problem of
what constitutes a final judgment or order has been a perplexing one both in federal and state
courts."); Holladay, Appellate Jurisdiction in Cases Involving Multiple Claims, 60 OKLA. B.J. 3227,
1991]
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the effect of letting one of the parties out of the case, then the ruling
would be final and immediately appealable.37 Where multiple claims
were involved, the disposition of one of several of them was immediately
appealable if it arose out of a transaction separate from the others,38 but
it was not appealable until the others were decided if it was interrelated
with them.39
The practical difficulty of applying these principles is illustrated by
Mann v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.' The plaintiff in
Mann sued his insurer for breach of the insurance contract and also for
bad faith refusal to pay under the policy. The trial court entered judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiff on the insurance contract, and the insurer
appealed the judgment and also applied for a writ of prohibition to pre-
vent the trial court from proceeding further with respect to the tort of
bad faith refusal to pay the insurance claim. The Oklahoma Supreme
Court held that the judgment on the insurance contract was separately
appealable from the tort of bad faith refusal to pay the insurance claim,
and it issued the writ of prohibition requested by the insurer that directed
the trial court to refrain from further proceeding with respect to the tort
3227 (1989) ("Appellate jurisdiction over trial court adjudications which only partially dispose or
the parties, or dispose of one or more but less than all of the claims in a lawsuit, can be a confusing
area for the Oklahoma practitioner.").
37. Frazier v. Bryan Memorial Hosp. Auth., 775 P.2d 281, 285 n.13 (Okla. 1989) (order of
dismissal that let a party out of the lawsuit was an appealable order); Esker v. Kip's Big Boy, Inc.,
632 P.2d 414 (Okla. 1981) (time to appeal began to run upon filing of journal entry denying judg-
ment to one of two plaintiffs); Ritter v. Perma-Stone Co., 325 P.2d 442, 443 (Okla. 1958) (order
sustaining demurrer as to one of two defendants was immediately appealable as a final order).
38. FDIC v. Ross, 62 OKLA. B.J. 3418 (Okla. 1991) (grant of summary judgment on counter-
claim was appealable final order based on separate and distinct claim); Eason Oil Co. v. Howard
Eng'g, Inc., 755 P.2d 669, 672 (Okla. 1988) ("[W]hen none of the multiple claims pressed in the
same action is interrelated with another, the trial court's decision determining all the issues in a
single claim will be deemed to constitute a judgment.") (emphasis in original) (dictum); Oklahomans
for Life, Inc. v. State Fair of Oklahoma, Inc., 634 P.2d 704, 706 (Okla. 1981) ("A trial court's
decision, which determines all of the issues in one entire cause of action among several stated in a
suit, constitutes a final appealable disposition.").
39. State ex rel Oklahoma Bar Ass'n. v. Brewer, 794 P.2d 397, 398 (Okla. 1989) ("When [a
trial court order leaves interrelated counterclaims unadjudicated] the order is not final for purposes
of appellate jurisdiction."); Eason Oil Co. v. Howard Eng'g, Inc., 755 P.2d 669, 672 (Okla. 1988)("All interrelated claims must be decided before judgment will be deemed to have been rendered.")
(emphasis in original); Reams v. Tulsa Cable Television, Inc., 604 P.2d 373, 374 (Okla. 1979)
("There can be no judgment when the court disposes of but a portion of a single cause of action.")
(emphasis in original); Hudson v. Total Petroleum, Inc., No. 71,771 (Okla. Ct. App. 1991) (unpub-
lished) (order sustaining motion for summary judgment against appellant's claims of oral lifetime
contract not final because unadjudicated counterclaim for money judgment against appellant at is-
sue); Testerman v. First Family Life Ins. Co., 808 P.2d 703 (Okla. Ct. App. 1990) (fraud claim only
one of multiple claims which addressed rights arising from single transaction; thus, disposition of
fraud claim was not appealable).
40. 669 P.2d 768 (Okla. 1983).
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claim until the determiniation of the appeal of the contract claim.41 Jus-
tice Opala wrote in dissent that because the breach of the insurance con-
tract and the tort of bad faith refusal to pay the insurance claim arose out
of the same transaction, they were not separate causes of action, but in-
stead were merely alternative theories of liability, each supporting a dif-
ferent measure of damages.42
The split on the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Mann shows how
hard it was to predict whether the trial court's determination was imme-
diately appealable, because it disposed of an entire claim, or was not ap-
pealable until the end of the case, because it resolved only a single theory
of liability. An immediate appeal might have been dismissed as prema-
ture if the Oklahoma Supreme Court had ruled that the trial court's deci-
sion did not entirely dispose of a claim. But an appeal filed at the end of
the case might be dismissed as untimely if the Oklahoma Supreme Court
ruled that the trial court had previously disposed of an entire claim. A
miscalculation could therefore have serious consequences.
Section 1006 was designed to eliminate the difficulties previously en-
countered with the timing of appeals in cases involving multiple claims
or parties by adopting a simple rule. Simply stated, a decision as to only
a part of a case is not appealable until the trial court decides all the issues
in the case. Some flexibility is provided, though, with an exception that
authorizes the trial court, after finding that there is no reason for delay-
ing the appeal to the end of the case, to expressly direct the preparation
and filing of a judgment as to fewer than all the claims and parties.
Where such an express direction is made by the trial court, it will be clear
that a party seeking appellate review must file a petition in error
promptly. On the other hand, in the absence of such an express direc-
tion, it will be clear that the appeal should not be filed until the judgment
determining all the issues in the case is filed with the court clerk. Under
section 1006, the trial judge plays the role of a dispatcher43 with the
responsibility for either sending a ruling on a claim up through the appel-
late process right away or detaining it below until all the claims in the
case are resolved.
The trial court is allowed to direct the preparation and filing of a
41. Id. at 772-773.
42. Id. at 773.
43. Cf Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 435 (1956) ("[Under Fed. R. Civ. P.
54(b)], the District Court is used as a 'dispatcher.' It is permitted to determine, in the first instance,
the appropriate time when each final decision' upon 'one or more but less than all' of the claims in a
multiple claims case is ready for appeal.") (emphasis in original).
1991]
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judgment on fewer than all the claims in a case only if its ruling lets one
of the parties (either plaintiff or defendant) out of the case entirely, or if
its ruling disposes of an entire claim. A trial court may not allow an
immediate appeal where it issues a ruling that disposes of only a single
theory of recovery against a party who remains in the case.' As under
prior Oklahoma law, the scope of a claim is determined by a transac-
tional approach,45 but section 1006 shifts the responsibility for determin-
ing whether a trial court's determination entirely disposes of a claim
from the appellant to the trial judge.46
Section 1006 was based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b),
whose language it tracks closely.47 Accordingly, the federal cases inter-
preting Federal Rule 54(b) should be followed in Oklahoma state
courts.
4 8
44. See Allegheny County Sanitary Auth. v. EPA, 732 F.2d 1167, 1172-73 (3d Cir. 1984) (mul-
tiple counts comprised only one claim and therefore trial court's certification under Fed. R. Civ. P.
54(b) did not confer appellate jurisdiction with respect to dismissal of one of the counts) (dictum);
Tolson v. United States, 732 F.2d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (trial court erred when it ordered entry of a
final judgment on one theory of recovery, while other theory based on same facts remained to be
tried); Backus Plywood Corp. v. Commercial Decal, Inc., 317 F.2d 339 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 375
U.S. 879 (1963) (Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) was not properly invoked to permit appeal from an order
striking two of three theories of recovery). Under federal practice, the distinction is often not an
easy one. See 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 2657 at 60
("Unfortunately, it is not always easy to tell whether an action presents multiple claims.").
45. See generally, Retherford v. Halliburton Co., 572 P.2d 966, 968-69 (Okla. 1977) (discussing
scope of cause of action). See also Spiegel v. Trustees of Tufts College, 843 F.2d 38, 45 (1st Cir.
1988) (counts which were dismissed were intertwined with those that were not, and so separate
judgment should not have been entered under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 24 (2) (1982) ("What factual grouping constitutes a 'transaction', and what grouping
constitute a 'series', are to be determined pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as
whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient
trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or business
understanding or usage.").
46. One significant modification effected by the 1991 Amendment was to strike from the statute
the District Court's authority to stay enforcement of the separate judgment on that claim. See
OKLA. STAT tit. 12 § 1006(B) (Supp. 1990) (repealed 1991). Section 1006(B) was derived from FED.
R. CIv. P. 62(h) and was meant to be applied in situations where immediate enforcement of a judg-
ment with respect to a single claim may create hardship, especially if other claims that have not yet
been adjudicated might be offset against the claim that would be enforceable. Cf Fleming v. Baptist
Gen. Convention, 742 P.2d 1087, 1099 (Okla. 1987) (Oklahoma Supreme Court ordered stay of
execution on main claim until the counterclaim was adjudicated). For federal cases granting stays
under Rule 62(h), see St. Marie & Son, Inc. v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 414 F.Supp. 71, 74 (D. Minn.
1976); Morand Bros. Beverage Co. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 25 F.R.D. 27, 29 (N.D. Ill.
1959).
47. Section 1006 is also similar to former Dist. Ct. R. 25, OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, ch. 2, app.
(1981), which was revoked and withdrawn on November 18, 1982, OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, ch. 2, app.
(Supp. 1990).
48. See Hall v. Goodwin, 775 P.2d 291, 293 (Okla. 1989) ("Because Oklahoma obtained its
discovery code from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we will examine the federal cases constru-
ing Rule 26."); Laubach v.Morgan, 588 P.2d 1071, 1073 (Okla. 1978) ("[I]f one state adopts a stat-
ute from another, it is presumed to adopt the construction placed upon that statute by the highest
12
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C. Suggested Reforms
Although the Oklahoma Legislature retained a few key provisions of
the Act in sections 990A and 1006, a number of problems remain that
can be resolved by further reforms, many of which may be taken from
the repealed Act.
1. Procedure for Preparation of Judgments
It would be desirable to have a statutory procedure for the prepara-
tion, signing, and filing of judgments. With their heavy caseloads and
limited clerical support, Oklahoma state court judges cannot realistically
be expected to prepare judgments for all the cases they handle. Substan-
tial responsibility for the preparation of judgments thus has to be given to
attorneys. Unfortunately, in some circumstances attorneys may be
tempted to drag out the preparation of judgments for tactical reasons,49
such as to delay the running of the time to appeal.
The Act attempted to deal with these problems in its section 1001 by
requiring the trial judge to either prepare the judgment or assign respon-
sibility for its preparation to one of the attorneys. Section 1001 provided
a ten day limit for the attorney who had been assigned in which to sub-
mit the proposed judgment to the court and to opposing counsel, who
would then have ten days to file specific objections to it with the court.
Section 1001 employed a default mechanism to bring about compliance
with the deadline for preparing the judgment: if the assigned attorney
did not prepare the proposed judgment within the prescribed time, then
any other party could prepare the judgment and submit it to the court.
In many cases, such as foreclosure proceedings, the prevailing party
may be able to anticipate the form of the judgment before the judge de-
cides the case. In these circumstances the attorney should be allowed to
furnish a proposed judgment to the judge at the time the case is submit-
ted for decision. Then the judge could sign the judgment immediately,
instead of assigning the preparation of the judgment to the prevailing
party's attorney after the case is decided. A provision authorizing the
submission of proposed judgments in advance of judicial decision would
facilitate the prompt preparation of judgments in many cases.
court of the other state."). For cases construing FED. R. CIv. P. 54(b), see Annotation, Modern
Status of Federal Civil Procedure Rule 54(b) Governing Entry of Judgment on Multiple Claims, 32
A.L.R. FED. 772 (1977); Annotation, Necessity of Statement of Reasons Underlying District Court's
Decision to Grant Ceritification Under Rule 54(b) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 89 A.L.R.
FED. 514 (1988).
49. Cf Brown v. Mayfield, 786 P.2d 708 (Okla. Ct. App. 1989).
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Because the judgment forms were the cause of most of the dissatis-
faction with the Act, their use should not be mandated. However, sug-
gested forms for judgments may be helpful for some attorneys, and they
could be included in a future statute as long as it was clear that it was not
mandatory to use them.
2. Awards of Costs, Attorney's Fees, and Interest
The Act had several beneficial provisions dealing with the award of
costs, attorney's fees, and interest, which should be included in future
legislation. Section 1001(A) stated that these items of ancillary relief
could be included in a judgment, but their absence would not prevent it
from being final. This provision was meant to resolve what had been a
persistent problem in appellate procedure." Section 1001(A) also pro-
vided that the trial court retained authority to award costs, attorney's
fees, and interest even after the filing of a petition in error. If the trial
court awards ancillary relief after a petition in error has been filed, appel-
late review may be sought under Rule 1.17(c) of the Rules of Appellate
* Procedure in Civil Cases through amendment of the petition in error.
Section 1003 specified a procedure for requesting costs, attorney's fees,
and interest, and this included a thirty day deadline for filing the request.
A deadline for seeking this ancillary relief appears to be missing from
Oklahoma, and it is sorely needed.
3. Notice of the Filing of the Judgment
Section 1002 had provisions which involved the court clerk in the
process of providing notice of the judgment to the parties in some cases.
It is appropriate to require the giving of notice of the filing of the judg-
ment, because the time to appeal is measured from the time of filing of
the judgment. Giving the court clerks responsibility for sending out this
notice generated substantial opposition to the Act from them, and this
should be avoided in future legislation by placing the entire burden of
giving notice on the parties. At the time the judge signs a judgment, he
can assign the giving of notice to the prevailing party, who would have
the appropriate incentive to send out the notice promptly in order to
start the runnirig of the time for filing an appeal.
4. Effect of Post-Trial Motions on Appeal Time
Under the final judgment rule, an appellate court does not review a
50. See Note, supra note 6.
[Vol. 26:489
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case until the trial court is through with it.5" When is a trial court really
through with a case, though? Even though a judgment is filed, the trial
court may grant a new trial or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
Until all the post-trial motions have been resolved, there is a possibility
that an appeal may become moot by the trial court's alteration of the
judgment. This possibility has been recognized for a long time in title 12,
section 991 of the Oklahoma Statutes,52 which provides that if a motion
for a new trial is fied, an appeal should not be taken until after the trial
court has ruled on the motion.
Other motions, such as motions to vacate a judgment, can also give
the trial court an opportunity to alter a judgment and moot an appeal.
But some of these may be filed years after a judgment, 3 and there is no
limit on the time for vacating a void judgment. 4 If the final judgment
rule required the time limits for filing motions to vacate to expire before
an appeal could be filed, then the time to appeal could be put off for an
51. See Eason Oil Co. v. Howard Eng'g, Inc., 755 P.2d 669, 672 (Okla. 1988) (a ruling of a trial
court that does not culminate in a judgment is not appealable, unless it falls within specific categories
of appealable orders); Stekoll v. Jones, 648 P.2d 13, 14 (Okla. 1982) (trial court ruling that was
conditioned on the occurrence of a future event was not final and appealable until the condition was
removed).
There are a number of good reasons for the final judgment rule. It averts the confusion and
wasted effort that could result if a trial court and an appellate court both handled a case at the same
time. The final judgment rule also allows the appellate review of all the trial judge's errors to be
consolidated into a single appeal, thus reducing work for the appellate court. By hearing a single
appeal at the end of the case, rather than piecemeal as the case progresses, the appellate court can get
a better perspective on the case. And finally, postponing an appeal until the end of the case reduces
the number of errors that have to be reviewed, because many of the errors committed against a party
will become moot if that party prevails at trial.
Even though there are many good reasons for the final judgment rule, there are also a number of
circumstances where an immediate appeal would be desirable, and so a number of exceptions to the
rule are necessary. The exceptions recognized in Oklahoma state courts are for the interlocutory
orders that are appealable by right under OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 952(b)(2), 993 (1991) and the
interlocutory orders that may be certified for appeal under OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 952(b)(3) (1991).
In addition, appellate review before final judgment may be obtained in some circumstances through
the extraordinary writs of mandamus and prohibition. For a recent discussion of appealable inter-
locutory orders, see Parkinson, Interlocutory Appeals in Oklahoma, 62 OKLA. B.J. 1397 (1990).
52. Before § 991 was adopted in 1968, see 1968 Okla. Sess. Laws 655, an appellant was required
to file a motion for new trial before commencing an appeal. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 623 (1961 &
Supp.1967) (repealed 1968).
53. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1038 (1991), which prescribes limitation periods that range from
one to three years for various grounds for vacating judgment. See also Westbrook v. Dierks, 292
P.2d 172, 175 (Okla. 1955) (two year term on motions to vacate on basis of fraud begins to run from
time fraud was or should have been discovered).
54. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1038 (1991) ("A void judgment may be vacated at any time, on
motion of a party, or any person affected thereby."). See also Chaney v. Reddin, 201 Okla. 264, 267,
205 P.2d 310, 313 (1949) (defendant who delayed more than eight years before attacking void judg-
ment was not precluded by laches); Hinkle v. Jones, 180 Okla. 17, 20, 66 P.2d 1073, 1077 (1937) (the
fact that defendant did not appeal from orders denying his prior motions to vacate did not preclude
him from attacking the judgment on the grounds that it was void).
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unreasonably long period. In fact, final judgments are never completely
final, but at a certain point they are final enough for purposes of filing an
appeal.
Section 991 drew the line for finality of judgments at motions for
new trial. Under section 991, the time to appeal was extended for mo-
tions for new trial, but not for the other post-trial motions, notably mo-
tions to vacate judgments. Unfortunately, it is not always possible to
distinguish a motion for new trial from a motion to vacate a judgment,
since the relief sought by these motions can be overlapping."5 As a con-
sequence, section 991 has produced uncertainty for attorneys and judges,
who have experienced some difficulties in applying it.
A more useful approach would not attempt to distinguish between
motions for new trial and motions to vacate a judgment on a conceptual
basis; instead, it would focus on a ten-day bright line rule. If a motion
for a new trial, a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or a
motion to vacate a judgment (whether denominated as a motion to re-
consider, alter, vacate, or amend a judgment) is filed not later than ten
days after the filing of a judgment, then it should extend the time for
appeal until the trial court's ruling on the motion.56 A denial of one of
55. Motions for vacating judgments under OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1031.1 (1991), can overlap
with motions for new trial, because the relief under § 1031.1 is not restricted to any specific grounds.
See Schepp v. Hess, 770 P.2d 34, 38 (Okla. 1989) ("Neither the terms of § 1031.1 nor those of its
common-law antecedents restrict the exercise of term-time power to any specific grounds.") (emphasis
in original). In addition, motions for new trial and motions for vacating judgments under OKLA.
STAT. tit. 12, § 1031 (1991), can have common grounds because § 1031 (First) authorizes a trial
court to vacate a judgment "[b]y granting a new trial for the cause within the time and in the manner
prescribed in section 653 of this title."
56. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1004 (Supp. 1990) (repealed 1991). This result conforms to prior
Oklahoma cases. See Hall v. Edge, 782 P.2d 122, 124 (Okla. 1989) (motion to vacate that was filed
within 10 days of the granting of summary judgment was treated as a new trial motion and extended
the time to appeal); Horizons, Inc. v. KEO Leasing Co., 681 P.2d 757, 759 (Okla. 1984) ("Plaintiff's
'motion to vacate', filed below within 10 days of the judgment date, was properly treated as one for
new trial."); Bloustine v. Bloustine, 745 P.2d 412, 413-14 (Okla. Ct. App. 1987) ("Motion for Inter-
pretation and/or Reconsideration" filed within 10 days of a divorce decree was treated as a new trial
motion and extended the time for appeal). See also Dist. Ct. R. 17 ("A motion seeking reconsidera-
tion, re-examination, rehearing or vacation ofa judgment or final order, which is filed within 10 days
of the day such decision was rendered, may be regarded as a new trial motion.").
The difficulty of determining which post-trial motions extend the time to appeal under section
991 is illustrated by the following cases: Salyer v. National Trailer Co., 727 P.2d 1361, 1362 (Okla.
1986) (two successive motions to reconsider were both treated as motions to vacate and did not
extend the time for appeal); Sellers v. Oklahoma Publishing Co., 687 P.2d 116, 119 (Okla. 1982)
(untimely motion for new trial was ineffective to extend time for appeal); Horizons, Inc. v. KEO
Leasing Co., 681 P.2d 757, 759 (Okla. 1984) (motion to vacate was treated as a motion for new trial
and extended the time for appeal); Knell v. Burnes, 645 P.2d 471, 473 (Okla. 1982) (motion to
reconsider extended time to appeal).
The federal courts also have experienced problems with distinguishing the post-trial motions
that extend the time for appeal from those that do not. See Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S.
[Vol. 26:489
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these post-trial motions will itself be a final order.5 7 A subsequent mo-
tion, however, will not extend the time to appeal. 8 The other side of the
bright line rule would be that a motion (however denominated) filed
more than ten days after the filing of a judgment would not extend the
time for appeal.59
5. Savings Provisions for Premature Appeals
The use of the date of filing as the beginning of the thirty day period
for commencing an appeal makes it possible that some appeals may be
filed prematurely on account of being filed after the judge's decision is
announced but before it is filed with the court clerk. An appeal may also
be premature if a post-trial motion has been filed, and the petition in
error is filed before the trial court has disposed of the post-trial motion.'
169 (1989) (filing of post-judgment motion for discretionary prejudgment interest extended time for
appeal); Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196 (1988) (plaintiff's request for attorney's
fees that were authorized by state law did not extend time to appeal); Buchanan v. Stanships, Inc.,
485 U.S. 265 (1988) (motion to alter or amend judgment to include costs did not extend time to
appeal); Harcon Barge Co. v. D & G Boat Rentals, Inc. 784 F.2d 665, 670 (5th Cir.) (any post-trial
motion that is served within 10 days after entry ofjudgment that is not a motion to correct a clerical
mistake extends the time to appeal) (en bane), cert. denied 485 U.S. 265 (1988). For a discussion of
these and other federal cases involving the effect of post-trial motions on the timing of appeals, see
Adams, The Timing of Appeals Under Rule 4(A)(4) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, 123
F.R.D. 371 (1989).
57. See Rule 1.10(a)(14) of the Oklahoma Rules of Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases.
58. Rule 1.12(c)(1) of the Oklahoma Rules of Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases provides in
part: "The time to appeal from the disposition of [a post-trial motion filed not later than 10 days
after the judgment] shall not be extended by any subsequent motion or plea for consideration."
59. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1004(D) (Supp. 1990) (repealed 1991). See also Rule 1.12(c)(2) of
the Oklahoma Rules of Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases ("A post-judgment motion, no matter
how denominated, filed later than ten (10) days after the date of judgment shall not delay the run-
ning of the time to appeal."). This result would be consistent with most of the prior Oklahoma
decisions. See Salyer v. National Trailer Convoy, Inc., 727 P.2d 1361, 1362 (Okla. 1986) (two suc-
cessive motions neither of which were filed within 10 days of the trial court's ruling did not extend
the time to appeal); Sellers v. Oklahoma Publishing Co., 687 P.2d 116, 118-19 (Okla. 1984) (motion
to reconsider that was filed 11 days after an order granting summary judgment was ineffective to
extend the time for appeal); Timeplan Corp. v. O'Connor, 461 P.2d 935 (Okla. 1969) (motion for
new trial that was filed after the expiration of the 10 day period was ineffective and did not extend
the time to appeal). See also Dist. Ct. R. 17 ("A motion, however styled, which is filed after the
expiration of ten days following the decision is ineffective as a motion for new trial and will not
extend appeal time."). This proposed rule, however, would lead to a different result than that
reached in Knell v. Burnes, 645 P.2d 471, 474 (Okla. 1982), where the time for appeal was extended
by a motion that was filed 16 days after the rendition of judgment.
60. For example, appeals were determined to be premature in Timmons Oil Co., Inc. v. Nor-
man, 794 P.2d 400 (Okla. 1990), and Delhi Gas Pipeline Corp. v. Mayhall, 546 P.2d 1019 (Okla. Ct."
App. 1976), because the petitions in error were filed while motions for new trial were pending. The
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals ruled in both cases that the petitions in error were ineffec-
tive, because they were filed before the respective trial courts ruled on the motions for new trial.
And because there were no subsequent petitions in error filed within 30 days after the trial courts
denied the motions for new trial, the appeals were dismissed.
A rule such as that proposed in this article might also obviate the current practice of filing
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Lastly, in a case involving multiple claims or parties, an appeal may be
premature if it is ified before all the claims involving all the parties are
adjudicated.61 By the time that the appellant finds out an appeal is pre-
mature, it may be too late to resurrect the appeal by filing a second peti-
tion in error, because the thirty days from the filing of a final judgment
may have expired.
Oklahoma law should provide a savings provision whereby an appel-
lant is given thirty days after being sent notice of the dismissal of an
appeal as premature in which to file a new petition in error. An appellant
should also be able to salvage a premature appeal before it is dismissed by
filing a supplemental petition in error after the trial court rules on the
post-trial motion. Allowing an appellant to file a new or supplemental
petition in error so that a premature appeal can go forward causes no
prejudice to an appellee, since even a prematurely filed petition in error
gives the appellee notice that an appeal is being sought.62
duplicative appeals from ambiguous oral or letter rulings from the court. Oklahoma cases vary
widely in the ultimate result. See eg. Miller v. Miller, 664 P.2d 1032, 1034 (Okla. 1983) ("A recital
in the clerk's minute that 'the court renders judgment for the defendant as per journal entry to be
filed' does not constitute ajudgment. . ."); Shaw v. Sturgeon, 304 P.2d 341, 343 (Okla. 1956) (court's
statement directing parties to prepare journal entry was not sufficiently explicit to qualify as a judg-
ment); News-Dispatch Printing & Audit Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 132 Okla. 216, 217, 270 P.2, 3
(1928) (minute entry reflecting that the court rendered judgment for the defendants "as per journal
entry to be filed" did not constitute a judgment); Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. McBroom, 526
P.2d 509, 511 (Okla. App. 1974) ("Judgment is rendered when pronounced by the Court and the
Journal Entry is only a record thereof.") (Approved for Publication by Supreme Court). Compare
with Warehouse Mkt., Inc. v. Berry, 459 P.2d 853 (Okla. 1969); Werfelman v. Miller, 180 Okla. 267,
69 P.2d 819 (1937), where oral renditions of judgment were held to trigger the appeal time. See
generally Morgan, Delayed Attacks on Final Judgments, 33 OKLA. L. REv. 45, 45 n. 1 (1980) ("A
judgment is rendered whenever the judge indicates a present intention to adjudicate the matter.
Since no particular form is required there is sometimes uncertainty as to exactly when a judgment is
pronounced."); Recent Development, Rendering of Judgment, 34 OKLA. L. REV. 416 (1981).
61. For example, an appeal of the trial court's ruling on a counterclaim was dismissed as pre-
mature in Eason Oil Co. v. Howard Eng'g, Inc., 755 P.2d 669 (Okla. 1988), because the petition in
error had been filed before the trial court had adjudicated the interrelated claim of the plaintiff. See
also Grider v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 62 OKLA. B.J. 3049 (Okla. Ct. App. 1991) (appeal premature
as to dismissal of one defendant).
62. FED. R. Apr. P. 4(a)(2) provides that appeals that are filed after the announcement of a
decision but before the entry of judgment are treated as filed after the entry of the judgment. This
eliminates one source of premature appeals in federal courts. Cf Firstier Mortgage Co. v. Investors
Mortgage Ins. Co., 111 S. Ct. 648, 651-53 (1991) (Advisory Committee Notes suggest that "Rule
4(a)(2) was intended to protect the unskilled litigant who files a notice of appeal from a decision that
he reasonably but mistakenly believes to be a final judgment, while failing to file a notice of appeal
from the actual final judgment.").
A large number of appeals have been dismissed by the federal courts because the notices of
appeal were filed before the disposition of the post-trial motions enumerated in FED. R. Apr. P.
4(a)(4), however. See, eg., Acosta v. Louisiana Dep't of Health & Human Resources, 478 U.S. 251
(1986) (per curiam) (appeal that was filed after the denial of a post-trial motion but before its entry
was dismissed because it was premature); Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56
(1982) (per curiam) (a notice of appeal that is filed while a post-trial motion is pending is a nullity).
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6. Stays of Enforcement of Judgments
The provisions in the Act's section 1007 should also be restored.
Although prior Oklahoma case law recognized an automatic ten day stay
of money judgments, it would be desirable to have an explicit codification
of this important principle. The future legislation should make clear that
the stay covers all means of collecting the judgment, whether through
execution or a judgment lien. The automatic say should also extend to
the period that a motion for new trial or other motion filed within ten
days of the judgment is being considered. A judgment should not be
considered final and enforceable until these post-trial motions are re-
solved. In addition, the statute should make clear that although a super-
sedeas bond or cash deposit in an appropriate amount must be filed in
order to stay a money judgment, the trial court has discretionary author-
ity to stay any other type of judgment.
7. Sanctions on Appeal
An additional portion of the Act that should be restored is section
1008, which authorized the Oklahoma appellate courts to dismiss frivo-
lous appeals and impose sanctions. The heavy caseloads in the appellate
system have created unsatisfactory delays. Undoubtedly, some appeals
are frivolous, and weeding them out and discouraging their filing would
produce greater efficiency and fairness in the appellate process.
II. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS
Since last visited,63 interesting issues of appellate procedure have
continued to arise. Moreover, both published and unpublished case law
have highlighted persistent problems for the Oklahoma practitioner.
While Oklahoma appellate procedure has its confusing aspects, the de-
tailed rules that govern the appellate process resolve many questions.64
See also Adams, supra note 56, at 372 n.6 (noting that there have been hundreds of federal court
decisions dealing with FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(4) since it was adopted in 1979). Unlike repealed section
1004, FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(4) has no savings provision for this source of premature appeals.
Where an appeal is premature because it is filed before all the claims against all the parties have
been adjudicated, the federal courts have permitted the notice of appeal to ripen when the final
judgment is entered, if this occurs before the disposition of the appeal. See Lewis v. B.F. Goodrich
Co, 850 F.2d 641, 645 (10th Cir. 1988) (en banc); Sacks v. Rothberg, 845 F.2d 1098, 1099 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (listing cases from most of the Circuits). For further discussion of these and other cases, see
Annotation, When Will Premature Notice of Appeal Be Retroactively Validated in Federal Civil
Cases?, 76 A.L.R. FED. 199, 208-16 (1986).
63. Medina, supra note 6.
64. For a listing of these rules, see supra note 11. An appellate attorney may also need to
consult local rules that regulate aspects of the appellate process. See. eg., Administrative Order of
1991)
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The following discussion has been divided into four areas: (1) appel-
late record problems; (2) general appellate issues; (3) practice before the
Courts of Appeal, and; (4) certiorari practice before the Supreme Court.
A. Appellate Record Problems
The most frequently recurring problems involving appellate proce-
dure are those associated with the preparation of the record on appeal.65
Although this Article will not replow ground excellently covered by
Judge Means and Susan Walker,66 their observations below are especially
worthy of repetition:
It often appears that counsel has placed unwarranted reliance on the
role of the court clerk and/or the court reporter in preparing the rec-
ord, and has been less than diligent in monitoring and ensuring its
prompt and thorough completion. This causes undue delay in appel-
late disposition, and can doom an appeal entirely; absent a record evi-
dencing reversible error, the trial court will be presumed correct and
the judgment or order affirmed.67
It is well settled that the attorney for the appellant has the primary re-
sponsibility for seeing that the record on appeal is completed in a timely
and proper fashion. 68 Admissions that are made in an appellate brief
may supplement the record,69 and in some circumstances, an appellate
August 4, 1989, ADC 89-21 (Tulsa County Dist. Ct.) (specifying procedures for designation of tran-
scripts and the filing of designations of record). There may also be specialized statutory provisions.
See, eg., OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 513 (1991) (decisions of state board of medical examiners); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 66, § 56 (1991) (eminent domain proceedings); OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 225 (1991) (tax
appeals).
65. See, eg., Oxley v. City of Tulsa, 794 P.2d 742, 748 (Okla. 1989); Davidson v. Gregory, 780
P.2d 679, 683 (Okla. 1989); Holley v. Shepard, 744 P.2d 945, 947 (Okla. 1987); Chamberlin v.
Chamberlin, 720 P.2d 721, 725 (Okla. 1986); and Lewis v. Dependent School District, 808 P.2d 710,
715 (Olda. Ct. App. 1990). Additionally, there have been dozens of unpublished opinions by the
Courts of Appeals in the past few years in which the appellate court refused to consider issues urged
on appeal because they were not supported by the record on appeal.
66. See Means & Walker, Reducing Errors and Omissions in Records on Appeal, 60 OKLA. B.J.
1884 (1989).
67. Id. at 1885.
68. Eg., Oxley v. City of Tulsa, 794 P.2d 742, 748 (Okla. 1989) ("It is the cross-appellant's
duty to ensure that there has been prepared a sufficient trial court record to show cause for reversal
at the appellate level."); Davidson v. Gregory, 780 P.2d 679, 682 (Okla. 1989) ("An appellant bears
the responsibility for incorporating into the appellate record all materials necessary to secure correc-
tive relief from a trial court's adverse decision."); Chandler v. Denton, 741 P.2d 855, 861 n.8 (Okla.
1987) ("It is the duty of the appealing party to procure a record that is adequate to support the quest
for the corrective relief sought."); Snyder v. Smith Welding & Fabrication, 746 P.2d 168, 171 (Okla.
1986) ("One who seeks corrective relief is responsible for and bound by, the contents of the record
presented for review.") (supplemental opinion on rehearing) (emphasis in original).
69. Deffenbaugh v. Hudson, 791 P.2d 84, 85 n.3 (Okla. 1990).
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court may allow an omission in the record to be corrected by amend-
ment,7" but merely attaching evidentiary materials to an appellate brief is
not an acceptable method of curing a deficiency in the record.7" In the
absence of a sufficient record to show cause for reversal, a reviewing
court will presume that a trial court's decision is correct.72
It is generally advisable for attorneys to have a stenographic record
made of any part of a proceeding that might possibly be the subject of
appellate review. 3 This point is illustrated by Watkins v. Sears & Roe-
buck & Co., Inc.,74 where the Court of Appeals was unable to review the
appellants' contention that inflammatory remarks in closing arguments
had prejudiced the jury, because they had waived recording of the closing
arguments.75 Whenever stenographic recording is requested, care should
be taken to document the request in writing in case the request is denied
without a record of the denial being made.76
Recording the hearing on a new trial motion may also be worth-
while in some cases. An appellant will generally be barred from raising
an issue on appeal that was not raised in a motion for new trial.77 The
70. Oxley v. City of Tulsa, 794 P.2d 742, 748 (Okla. 1989) (affidavit of Court Clerk supplied the
basis for allowing the record to be corrected by amendment).
71. Chamberlin v. Chamberlin, 720 P.2d 721, 723-24 (Okla. 1986) ("This court may not con-
sider as part of an appellate record any instrument or material which has not been incorporated into
the assembled record by a certificate of the clerk of the trial court, nor may a deficient record be
supplemented by material physically attached to a party's appellate brief."). See also Robert L.
Wheeler Inc. v. Scott, 818 P.2d 475 (Okla. 1991) (attaching copy of pretrial order to brief, where
such order not part of record, unavailing).
72. Davidson v. Gregory, 780 P.2d 679, 682-83 (Okla. 1989); Chandler v. Denton, 741 P.2d
855, 862 (Okla. 1987).
73. Van Galder, Pointers on How to Perfect a Civil Appeal, 56 OKLA. B.J. 767, 768 (1985)
("[P]erhaps the most important rule concerning preserving the record is to make sure all proceedings
are properly recorded.").
74. No. 70,954 (Okla. Ct. App. 1990) (unpublished).
75. To obtain appellate review, the appellant should have resorted to the narrative statement
procedure described infra in the text accompanying note 81. See also Wilhelm v. Jacobs, No. 73, 638
(Okla. Ct. App.1990) (unpublished) (proceeding before small claims court untranscribed; appellate
court noted alternatives, such as use of Rule 1.22).
76. Cf Carey v. Maynard, No. 72, 370 (Okla. Ct. App. 1991) (unpublished) (plaintiff's claim
that he was prevented by court from introducing evidence not supported by the record); FDIC v.
Jarmon, No. 74,966 (Okla. Ct. App. 1991) (unpublished) (no affidavit or other competent evidence
in record to establish that trial court refused to allow recordation of argument); Ryan v. Townsend,
No. 66,759 (Okla. Ct. App. 1990) (unpublished) (trial court's order did not reflect that the appellants
had requested a court reporter to transcribe the hearing for which appellate review was sought or
that the court had denied the request).
77. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 991(b) (1991) provides: "If a motion for a new trial be filed and a
new trial be denied, the movant may not, on the appeal, raise allegations or error that were available
to him at the time of the filing of his motion for a new trial but were not therein asserted." See also
Rule 1.17(a) of the Oklahoma Rules of Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases ("[I]f a party has filed a
motion for new trial, errors either not alleged in that motion or not fairly comprised within the
grounds alleged therein may not be asserted on appeal by such party."); Dist. Ct. R. 17 ("At the
21
Adams and Medina: Recent Developments in Oklahoma Civil Appellate Procedure
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1990
TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 26:489
omission of an issue from the written motion may be cured, however, if
the issue was clearly identified at the hearing on the motion without ob-
jection from the opposing party.7" For the omission to be cured, though,
there must be a proper record of the hearing.79 Obviously, however, rely-
ing on the transcript of a hearing on a new trial motion to cure defects in
the motion is an inferior alternative for preserving issues for appellate
review as compared to including them in the written motion for new
trial, or refraining from moving for a new trial at all.
Stenographic recording is the best means for making a record on
appeal, but if a stenographic transcript of a proceeding was not made or
is not available, the alternatives provided in rules 1.22 and 1.23 of the
Oklahoma Rules of Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases may be used. A
privately-contracted reporter's notes, however, may not be used. 0 Rule
1.22 authorizes preparation and use of a narrative statement in lieu of a
stenographic transcript. It prescribes that an appellant may prepare a
statement of the evidence in narrative form from the best sources avail-
able, including his personal recollection, file it with the court clerk, and
send a copy to opposing counsel. The narrative statement is then sub-
jected to scrutiny from opposing parties, who may fie objections or pro-
posed amendments. After settlement of any objections or proposed
amendments and approval by the trial court, the court clerk is required
to include the narrative statement in the record on appeal.8" The other
hearing on the motion or on appeal the movant may not rely on errors which are not fairly embraced
in the specific grounds stated in the timely-filed motion for new trial.").
78. Horizons, Inc. v. KEO Leasing Co., 681 P.2d 757, 759 (Okla. 1984). Although the
Supreme Court ruled that the motion for new trial was too vague to preserve any errors for appellate
review, it went on to rescue the appellant by deciding that the lack of specificity in the motion for
new trial was cured by the specific statements of the grounds for the motion that were made at its
hearing without any objection from the opposing party. See also Reeves v. Agee, 769 P.2d 745, 751
(Okla. 1989) (lack of specificity in motion for new trial was cured at the hearing on the motion, and
so the errors urged on appeal were properly preserved for review); Huff v. Huff, 687 P.2d 130, 132
(Okla. 1984) (remanding case for Court of Appeals to determine whether the defect in the appel-
lant's motion for new trial was cured at the hearing on the motion).
79. Cole v. Gossett, No. 71,521 (Okla. Ct. App. 1990) (unpublished) (Court of Appeals could
not determine whether Horizons, Inc. v. KEO Leasing Co., supra note 78, was applicable without a
transcript of the hearing on the motion for new trial); Brewer Const. Co. v. Employers Casualty
Corp., No. 71, 190 (Okla. Ct. App. 1990) (unpublished) (without a transcript of the hearing on the
motion for new trial, the Court of Appeals could not determine whether there was an attempt to
cure defects in the written motion).
80. Doyle v. Couch, 806 P.2d 71 (Okla. 1991); See also Watkins v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Inc.
No. 70,954 (Okla. Ct. App. 1990) (unpublished) (privately recorded closing arguments not
considered).
81. See Cox v. Smith, 682 P.2d 228, 231 n.8 (Okla. 1984) (adopting requirement that the narra-
tive statement and any objections or proposed amendments must be submitted to the trial court for
settlement and approval). For an example of an appropriate narrative statement, see Douglas v.
Steele, 62 OKLA. B.J. 3023, 3026-27 (Okla. Ct. App. 1991) (Means, C.J., dissenting).
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alternative to a stenographic transcript is the statement of the case in lieu
of a record on appeal authorized by rule 1.23 of the Oklahoma Rules of
Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases. Rule 1.23 provides that where the
only issues to be presented on appeal are legal issues which can be deter-
mined without examining the trial court record, the parties may prepare
and jointly sign a statement of the case. Upon submission to the trial
court, the statement is certified by the trial judge to be the record on
appeal. Unless the steps specified in rules 1.22 or 1.23 are followed, the
appellate court will not review a record of the proceedings that has been
prepared by the parties themselves.82 In addition, in order to move for a
new trial under Section 655 of title 1213 on the basis of impossibility of
preparing a record for appeal, a party must demonstrate an attempt to
obtain a narrative statement under rule 1.22.84
Another area of concern involving record preparation has been the
requirement for memorialization of the decision being appealed.8" An
appellate court needs to have the trial court orders that it is being asked
to review properly memorialized so that it can adequately perform its
role.86 In addition and most importantly, a memorialization of the order
or judgment being appealed is required before an appellate court may
initiate its review process.87
82. Hamid v. Sew Original, 645 P.2d 496, 497 (Okla. 1982) ("Neither our case law nor the
court rules... will authorize this court to accept - in lieu of a stenographic transcript of trial court
proceedings - a narrative statement, prepared and signed by the defeated litigant, which gives only
that litigant's version of what had occurred in the courtroom.").
83. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 655 (1991).
84. See, eg., Claro v. State, No. 74,921 (Okla. Ct. App. 1990) (unpublished). Cf Collins v.
Three M Invs., Inc., No. 73,496 (Okla. Ct. App. 1991) (unpublished) (failure to comply with proce-
dure under § 655 dooms appeal).
85. See, eg., Brown v. Mayfield, 786 P.2d 708, 710 (Okla. Ct. App. 1989) (Court of Appeals
issued three consecutive orders to the parties and the trial judge for them to prepare a journal entry
to memorialize the judgment).
86. As is explained in Means & Walker, Reducing Errors and Omissions in Records on Appeal,
60 OKLA. B.J. 1884, 1888 (1989):
[T]he appellate court cannot review a judgment or order for error if the court is not in-
formed as to the full nature and extent of the relief granted below. The only legitimate
evidence of the existence, terms and effect of the trial court's adjudication is the record
entry bearing the judge's signature. The presence of such written order is therefore indis-
pensable to a complete appellate record.
Id. at 1888 (footnote omitted).
87. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 32.3 (1991). See Johnson v. Johnson, 674 P.2d 539 (Okla. 1983),
construing a provision identical to § 32.3, Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 32.2 (Supp. 1989) (repealed 1990);
Hill v. Hill, 62 OKLA. B.J. 3609 (Okla. Ct. App. 1991) (appeal dismissed for failure to comply with
order to provide signed journal entry of judgment).
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B. General Appellate Issues
This section of the Article covers developments in appellate proce-
dure that are not specific to either the Oklahoma Courts of Appeal or the
Oklahoriha Supreme Court. These include recent cases dealing with the
designation of the appellants in the petition in error, interlocutory appel-
late review, preserving objections to jury instructions, and the abandon-
ment of an appeal through payment of the underlying judgment.
1. Designation of the Appellants
Although most defects in a petition in error may be corrected by
amendment,"8 additional parties to an appeal generally may not be added
by amendment once the time to appeal has expired. 89 Despite this gen-
eral rule, the Oklahoma Supreme Court permitted the amendment of a
petition in error to reflect a party's status as an appellant in Bane v. An-
derson, Bryant & Co. 90 Following a judgment against a company and
two individuals, a petition in error was filed in Bane that listed only the
company as the appellant in its caption. The Supreme Court permitted
the petition in error to be amended to include one of the individual de-
fendants as an appellant, but not the other. The individual defendant
who was allowed to be a party to the appeal was the president of the
company and was represented by the same attorney that represented the
company, and the attorney submitted an affidavit that all the pleadings in
the appeal had been filed on behalf of both the company and the individ-
ual defendant. In addition, the trial court had made a reference in a post-
trial order to a pending appeal brought by the company and the individ-
ual defendant. Because of these special circumstances, the Supreme
Court ruled that the company president was a proper party appellant,
but the other individual was not.91 A spirited dissent92 urged adoption of
the stricter rule applied in federal courts that bars any amendments to a
notice of appeal to add additional appellants. 93 Even though the major-
ity did not adopt the more rigid federal rule, Bane represents a narrow
88. Rule 1.17 (a) of the Oklahoma Rules of Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases.
89. Ogle v. Ogle, 517 P.2d 797, 799 (Okla. 1973) ("[Rule 1.17(a)] does not contemplate amend-
ment to substitute appellants. Otherwise, the rule, so applied, could, and here would, contravene the
time limitation provision of 12 O.S. 1971, § 990.").
90. 786 P.2d 1230 (Okla. 1989).
91. The other individual filed an application to enter an appearance and a request to be in-
cluded as an appellant. The Supreme Court ruled that the application and request did not invoke
appellate jurisdiction because it did not satisfy the formal requirements for a petition in error and it
was also filed out of time. Bane, 786 P.2d at 1234.
92. Id. at 1238-42 (Opala, V.C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
93. See Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 314 (1988) ("The failure to name a
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holding that is unlikely to be extended to permit amendments adding
parties to petitions in error in other cases.
A later decision by the Oklahoma Court of Appeals concerned an
appeal from an order imposing sanctions on an attorney.94 The Court of
Appeals first determined that the attorney was the real party in interest
in the appeal because the sanctions were imposed against her personally.
It then dismissed the appeal on the grounds that the attorney was not
designated as the appellant in either the caption or the body of the peti-
tion in error.95
2. Interlocutory Appellate Review
In McLin v. Trimble,96 the Oklahoma Supreme Court addressed an
interesting issue involving the application of federal procedural law in a
case arising under federal law that was being litigated in an Oklahoma
state court. An inmate filed a federal civil rights case in an Oklahoma
state court against three correctional officers. Two of the defendants fied
a motion for summary judgment based on the defense of qualified immu-
nity. After the trial court denied the motion, the defendants appealed.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court noted that the defendants would have
been entitled to an immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine
if the case had been filed in federal court.97 The collateral order doctrine
is not recognized in Oklahoma appellate procedure, however, and there
was no other avenue for immediate appellate review authorized by
Oklahoma law. On the other hand, the Supreme Court determined that
party in a notice of appeal... constitutes a failure of that party to appeal."). See also Minority
Employees of the Tenn. Dep't of Employment Sec., Inc. v. Tennessee Dep't of Employment See.,
901 F.2d 1327, 1330 (6th Cir. 1990) ("We hold that the term "et al" is insufficient to designate
appealing parties in a notice of appeal and that appellants must include in the notice of appeal the
name of each and every party taking the appeal."). But cf Hartford Casualty Ins. Co. v. Borg-
Warner Corp., 913 F.2d 419, 423 (7th Cir. 1990) ("We join the Tenth Circuit in ruling that a notice
of appeal is sufficient where the caption names all of the parties seeking to appeal and where the text
in the body sufficiently identifies the parties through the use of a generic term such as 'plaintiff' or
'defendants.' ").
94. Davis v. Howard, 803 P.2d 1172 (Okla. Ct. App. 1990).
95. 803 P.2d at 1173-74. See also FTC v. Amy Travel Serv., Inc. 894 F.2d 879 (7th Cir. 1989)
(dismissing attorney's appeal of rule I1 sanctions order because the notice of appeal named the
attorney's clients instead of the attorney); Vickers v. Jaques, No. 71,410 (Okla. App. 1990) (unpub-
lished) (dismissing appeal from order requiring an attorney to personally pay opposing party's legal
fees because the attorney was not designated as the appellant in either the caption or the body of the
petition in error). See also 9 J. MOORE, B. WARD & J. LucAs, MOORE's FEDERAL PRAcTICE,
203.17[l], at pp. 3-74 to 3-75 (1991) (noting need for particular care where attorney seeks to appeal
sanctions).
96. 795 P.2d 1035 (Okla. 1990).
97. Id. at 1037. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524-30 (1985). See also McLin, 795
P.2d at 1037 n.2 (listing federal cases that have followed Mitchell).
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federal law entitled the defendants to appellate review before trial of a
trial court order denying their claim of qualified immunity.98 It then
resolved the dilemma by permitting immediate review through an origi-
nal action. The dissent emphasized that federal supremacy did not re-
quire Oklahoma courts to follow federal appellate procedure unless the
state appellate procedure violated due process.99 Nevertheless, the ma-
jority's decision to permit immediate review through an original proceed-
ing makes good sense, because it avoids the creation of a significant
disparity between the treatment of civil rights cases in state and federal
courts that would lead to forum-shopping. Allowing immediate review
of the denial of a defense of qualified immunity removes an incentive for
civil rights plaintiffs to file their cases in state rather than federal court.
3. Preserving Objections to Jury Instructions
The Oklahoma Supreme Court did much to clarify the law concern-
ing the appellate review of jury instructions in Sellars v. McCullough."°
After the jury returned a defense verdict, the plaintiff appealed on the
grounds that the trial court had improperly given a jury instruction con-
cerning contributory negligence, when there had been no evidence of
contributory negligence introduced at trial. The Supreme Court af-
firmed, holding that the plaintiff had not properly preserved her objec-
tion for appellate review. The Supreme Court explained that the trial
court has an obligation to give jury instructions that accurately reflect
the law, but the parties have the responsibility for framing the issues that
are tried and making sure that the jury instructions are addressed to
those issues. Consequently, the giving of legally incorrect jury instruc-
tions is what has been termed "fundamental error," which will be re-
viewed on appeal even if the parties do not object to them at trial. On the
other hand, the parties must object to the giving of jury instructions that
although legally correct, are not applicable to the issues presented at trial
in order to obtain appellate review of the giving of the instructions. The
Supreme Court ruled that in the absence of an objection, it will review
only "the four corners of the instruction that was given to ascertain
whether it embodies a correct statement of the law."''1 The Supreme
Court's definitive ruling in Sellars apparently was missed by the
98. 795 P.2d at 1040 ("The federal entitlement in the present case is review, prior to trial, ofan
erroneous trial court decision denying a claim of immunity.").
99. Id. at 1044-45 (Opala, V.C.J., dissenting).
100. 784 P.2d 1060 (Okla. 1989).
101. Id. at 1063.
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Oklahoma Court of Appeals in a later decision."°2 Without any citation
to Sellars, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals found fundamental error in
the giving of a jury instruction that it determined was not supported by
the evidence and the refusal to give another jury instruction that it deter-
mined was supported by the evidence.
In addition to asserting an objection at trial, a party who wishes to
challenge a jury instruction should also set it out verbatim in the appel-
late brief or in an appendix to the brief."0 3 Otherwise the appellate court
will generally decline review. However, a failure to set out the instruc-
tion in the brief in chief or its appendix can be cured by setting out the
instruction in an appendix to the reply brief."l 4
4. Abandonment of an Appeal Through Payment of the
Underlying Judgment
An appeal was allowed to continue after the underlying judgment
had been paid in Grand River Dam Authority v. Eaton."°5 The case arose
out of an overpayment of a commissioner's award in a land condemna-
tion matter where the award had been paid into the court and then was
withdrawn by the appellants. After the appellee obtained a judgment to
recover the overpayment, the appellants attempted to protect their farm
from a judgment lien by depositing the amount of the judgment with the
court clerk pursuant to section 706.2 of title 12.106 The appellee re-
sponded with a request under section 706.3 for a court order requiring
the deposit of additional cash to cover costs and interest on appeal. The
appellee had also obtained issuance of a writ of execution, and a deputy
sheriff informed the appellants that if the judgment was not paid, their
property, including their farm, would have to be sold. Worried that they
102. See Lee v. Cotton, 61 OKLA. BJ. 1966, 1967 (Okla. Ct. App. 1990).
103. Rule 15 of the Rules of the Supreme Court (1991) (before its recent amendment) provided
in part: "Where a party complains of an instruction given or refused, he shall set out in totidem
verbis the instruction or the portion thereof to which he objects together with his objection thereto."
"In totidem verbis" means "in precisely the same words," BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 738 (5th ed.
1979), or "in so many words," BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 659 (3d ed. 1969). See also James
v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 810 P.2d 365 (Okla. 1991) (amending Rule 15 to permit instructions to
be set out in an appendix to the brief). See amended Rule 15, 62 OKLA. B.J. 1664 (1991).
104. James v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 810 P.2d 365 (Okla. 1991). Previously such a
correction would only be appropriate where opposing counsel did not object to the omission of the
instruction in the brief in chief. Compare Bentley v. Hardin, 577 P.2d 471, 473 n.1 (Okla. Ct. App.
1978) (no objection), overruled in James, 810 P.2d at 371-72, with Johndrow v. Eastern Okla. Physi-
cal Therapy, Inc., No. 70,845 (Okla. Ct. App. 1990) (unpublished) (appellee objected to omission of
challenged jury instruction from the appellant's brief in chief).
105. 803 P.2d 705 (Okla. 1990).
106. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 706.2 (1991).
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would lose their farm through execution, the appellants instructed the
court clerk to apply the section 706.2 cash deposit to satisfaction of the
judgment. The appellee then moved to dismiss the appeal on the grounds
that the appellants had acquiesced in the judgment by satisfying it.
The Supreme Court denied the motion to dismiss, noting that the
appellee had not shown that the appellants intended to abandon their
appeal. Expressly disapproving language to the contrary in prior deci-
sions, it held that the payment of a judgment did not cause an appeal to
become moot, unless the payment was made with either the intent to
settle the case, or the payment made reversal of the judgment impossible.
A dissent complained that the new rule announced by the majority
would generate factual disputes over a judgment debtor's intent when-
ever a judgment was paid while a case was on appeal. 10 7 As an alterna-
tive to the majority's holding, it recommended adoption of a procedure
for a judgment creditor to pay a judgment "under protest" by tendering
the amount of the judgment to the court clerk, who would deposit the
money in an interest-bearing account during the appeal.108 Under the
majority's holding, any payment will be "under protest" in the absence of
evidence to the contrary.
The Grand River decision is a salutary one and will benefit both
appellants and appellees. Although there is a possibility that a factual
dispute over an appellant's intent could arise, this can be easily avoided
through the use of an express statement that payment of the judgment
was "under protest." Payment of a judgment provides an option to the
procedures for stay of execution and discharge of a judgment lien that is
likely to be useful in many cases. Once a judgment is paid, the liability
can be removed from the appellant's accounting records. Also, payment
of the judgment stops accrual of post-judgment interest and saves an ap-
pellant the expense of a surety bond. Giving appellants the option to pay
a judgment without abandoning an appeal also benefits appellees as it
enables them to obtain immediate access to the money. Although a
number of appellants may prefer to pay a judgment while it is on appeal,
the procedures for stay of execution and discharge of a judgment lien
remain available for cases where an appellant is concerned about the dif-
ficulty of obtaining restitution from the appellee after reversal of the un-
derlying judgment.
107. Grand River Dam Auth., 803 P.2d at 710-12 (Opala, V.CJ., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
108. Id. at 713.
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A question that is likely to arise after Grand River is whether a
plaintiff-appellant may accept payment of a judgment without aban-
doning the appeal. A line of cases have held that an appellant may not
accept the fruits of a judgment by accepting payment and at the same
time seek to repudiate it through an appeal.109 The majority in Grand
River distinguished one of these cases110 on the grounds that the appel-
lants before it had not accepted any benefits from the judgment by paying
it. Allowing appellants to pay a judgment, while not allowing them to
accept payment, without abandoning an appeal, could produce unsatis-
factory results in particular cases. If a plaintiff and defendant were both
unhappy with a judgment and both wanted to appeal, then Grand River
might allow the plaintiff to pay the judgment while the case was on ap-
peal, but the defendant would be forbidden from accepting payment
without waiving his own appeal. The logic of Grand River would seem to
compel that the line of cases holding that an appellant's acceptance of
payment renders an appeal moot should be overturned. Nevertheless,
until the Supreme Court overrules these cases, appellants should not ac-
cept payment of a judgment if they intend to continue with the appeal.
5. Briefing Problems
Parties are still having their briefs stricken for failing to comply with
the applicable procedural rules,"' or ignored for failing to reference
either evidentiary support for factual allegations,1 2 or to cite supporting
109. Hart v. Jett Enters., Inc., 744 P.2d 561, 562-63 (Okla. 1985); Adams v. Unterkircher, 714
P.2d 193, 196 (Okla. 1985); Tarm Oil Co. v. Kennedy & Mitchell, Inc., 622 P.2d 1076, 1077-78
(Okla. 1981); Bras v. Gibson, 529 P.2d 982 (Okla. 1974). A number of cases recognize an exception
to this rule, though, for "no risk appeals,"where there is no possibility that the appeal will result in a
less favorable judgment for the appellant. See Teel v. Public Serv. Co., 767 P.2d 391, 396 (Okla.
1985); United Engines, Inc. v. McConnell Constr., Inc., 641 P.2d 1101, 1104-05 (Okla. 1981); Dick-
son v. Dickson, 637 P.2d 110, 112 (Okla. 1981); Marshall v. Marshall, 364 P.2d 891, 895 (Okla.
1961). If there is no possibility of a less favorable judgment, the acceptance of the undisputed mini-
mum to which the appellant is entitled is not inconsistent with the appeal. Furthermore, the general
rule operates only when the appellant acquires something of benefit. Thus, an attempted execution
on the judgment, which achieves no gain, does not preclude pursuit of the appeal. Robert L.
Wheeler, Inc. v. Scott, 818 P.2d 475, 477-78 (Okla. 1991).
110. Tara Oil Co. v. Kennedy & Mitchell, Inc., 622 P.2d 1076 (Okla. 1981).
1ll. See, eg., In re Ray, 804 P.2d 458 (Okla. Ct.App. 1990) (brief stricken for intentional viola-
tion of procedural rule governing maximum number of pages for briefs); Brown v. Mayfield, 786
P.2d 709 (Okla. Ct. App. 1989). For federal cases, see Annotation, Sanctions in Federal Circuit
Courts of Appeal for Failure to Comply with Rules Relating to Contents of Briefs and Appendixes, 55
A.L.R FED. 521 (1981).
112. See, e.g., Caltex Resources Corp. v. Robert Gordon Oil Co., No. 69,443 (Okla. Ct. App.
1989) (unpublished). See also Maples v. Bryce, 434 P.2d 214 (Okla. 1967); City National Bank &
Trust Co. v. Conrad, 416 P.2d 942 (Okla. 1966); Nunn v. Spears, 171 Okla. 329, 42 P.2d 892 (1935).
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legal citations. 113
C. Practice Before the Oklahoma Court of Appeals
The major problem in practice before the Courts of Appeals has
been the procedural trap in rule 3.13(B) of the Rules on Practice and
Procedure in the Court of Appeals and On Certiorari to That Court, 114
which until recently denied the opportunity to petition for certiorari to a
party who failed to petition for rehearing in the Court of Appeals.11 By
the time the Supreme Court dismisses a petition for certiorari for failure
to petition the Court of Appeals for a rehearing, the twenty day period 6
for petitioning for rehearing will usually have expired, and review by the
Supreme Court will therefore be barred. The Supreme Court displayed a
forgiving attitude towards untimely petitions for rehearing in Stiles v.
Oklahoma Tax Commission,' 7 when it granted a petition for certiorari
when the petition for rehearing was filed one day past the twenty day
deadline. On the other hand, the petition for certiorari in Griffith v. Spe-
cial Indemnity Fund 11 8 was denied, because the petition for rehearing
was untimely and there was no showing of good cause for the late filing
of the petition for rehearing.
Petitions for rehearing are only rarely granted by the Oklahoma
Courts of Appeals,119 and so requiring a petition for rehearing as a pre-
requisite for a petition for certiorari is probably not warranted. 120 Ear-
lier this year, the Supreme Court amended the rules to delete the
113. See, eg., Anderson v. Dyco Pet. Corp. 782 P.2d 1367, 1379 (Okla. 1989). Ofcourse, failure
to file the appellate brief can have obvious and undesirable consequences. See Van Galder, Pointers
on How to Perfect a Civil Appeal, 56 OKLA. B.J. 770, 771 (1985) (summarizing consequences).
114. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, ch. 15, app. 3 (1991).
115. See, eg., Scott v. University of Oklahoma, No. 72,619 (Okla. 1990) (unpublished) (dis-
missing petition for certiorari for failure to comply with rule 3.13(b)); Lewallen v. Mayberry, No.
59,338 (Okla. 1984) (unpublished) (semble). Petitions for rehearing have also been denied for failure
to comply with Rule 3.9's requirement that the petition be filed combined with the brief in its sup-
port. See Stiles v. Stiles, No. 71,215 (Okla. Ct. App. 1989) (unpublished) (no brief); Yukon Nat'l.
Bank v. Holland, No. 70,439 (Okla. Ct. App. 1989) (unpublished) (motion for extension to file brief
in support of petition for rehearing denied).
116. See Rule 3.9 of the Rules on Practice and Procedure in the Court of Appeals and On
Certiorari to That Court; Rule 28 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Okahojna. See also 57
OKLA. B. J. 2147 (1986) (Court of Appeals gives notice to bar that extensions of time for petitions
for rehearing will not be granted unless good cause is shown).
117. 752 P.2d 800, 801 n.1 (Okla. 1987).
118. 785 P.2d 1042 (Okla. 1990).
119. Medina, Discretionary Review in the Oklahoma Supreme Court: A Practical Guide to the
Court's Certiorari Jurisdiction, 13 OKLA. CITY U.L. REv. 257, 265 n.30 (1988) (survey showed that
less than two percent of petitions for rehearing were granted).
120. Medina, supra note 119, at 264-67. Motions for new trial are no longer a prerequisite for
appellate review in Oklahoma state courts. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 991 (1991). In the federal
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requirement of filing of a petition for rehearing.121
Oral argument is not a major feature of Oklahoma appellate prac-
tice, 122 except in fast track appeals.12 3 Although it appears to grant it
only rarely, 24 the Oklahoma Court of Appeals has adopted a set of rules
governing oral argument. 125
Once a case is assigned to the Oklahoma Court of Appeals, it gener-
ally will be decided there, subject to later review by the Oklahoma
Supreme Court through petition for certiorari. A case may be retrans-
ferred to the Supreme Court, however, under rule 1.204(111) of the
Oklahoma Rules of Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases, if the chief judge
of the division to which the case is assigned certifies that the case involves
issues of major significance to the public. A case was recently retrans-
ferred under this little-used procedure. 126
Rule 1.200 of the Oklahoma Rules of Appellate Procedure in Civil
Cases governs the publication of opinions of the Oklahoma Supreme
Court and Court of Appeals. Designation of an opinion for publication
normally occurs at the time the Court of Appeals adopts an opinion,12 7
but if the Court of Appeals decides not to order publication a party or
system, there is no need to file a petition for rehearing in Courts of Appeals before petitioning for
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1988). One proper function,
however, of a petition for rehearing is to advise the court of factual errors contained in the court's
opinion.
121. See Amendments, 62 OKLA. B.J. 1495, effective May 10, 1991, amending rule 3.13(B) of the
Rules on Practice and Procedure in the Court of Appeals and on Certiorari to that Court to provide
that "[a] party may petition for certiorari without having first sought rehearing in the Court of
Appeals."
122. See Rule 25 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma ('No oral argument will be
granted as a matter of right."). Cf, Rule 3.7 of the Rules on Practice and Procedure in the Court of
Appeals and On Certiorari to That Court ("Oral arguments and informal predecisional conferences
with counsel may be granted in the Court of Appeals at the discretion of the division."). For con-
trasting views on the value of oral argument, compare Martineau, The Value of Appellate OralArgu-
ment: A Challenge to the Conventional Wisdom, 72 IowA L. REV. 1 (1986) with Bright, The Power
of the Spoken Word: In Defense of Oral Argument, 72 IowA L. Rv. 35 (1986). See also Wood-
ward, The Argument for Oral Argument, 52 OKLA. B.J. 1767 (1981).
123. For discussions of fast track appeals, see Perry, The Fast Track- Accelerated Disposition of
Civil Appeals in the Oklahoma Supreme Court, 6 OKLA. Crrv U.L. Rev. 453 (1981); VanGalder,
Pointers on How to Perfect a Civil Appeal, 56 OKLA. B.J. 767, 769 (1985). A somewhat similar
procedure used in the California Court of Appeal Third Appellate District is described in Chapper,
Oral Argument and Expediting Appeals: A Compatible Combination, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 517
(1983).
124. Motions for oral argument were denied in Walden v. Hughes, No. 70,832 (Okla. Ct. App.
1990) (unpublished); Pavestone v. Interlock Pavers, Inc., No. 69, 276 (Okla. Ct. App. 1989) (unpub-
lished), and O'Petro Energy Corp. v. Canadian State Bank, No. 68,988 (Okla. Ct. App. 1989)
(unpublished).
125. In re: Rules for Oral Argument, 57 OKLA. B.J. 1384 (1988).
126. See Greening Donald Co. v. Oklahoma Wire Rope Prods., Inc., 766 P.2d 970, 971 (Okla.
1988). Robert L. Wheeler, Inc. v. Scott, 818 P.2d 475, 479 (Okla. 1991).
127. Rule 1.200(C)(B), Rules of Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases.
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other interested person may move for publication. Such a motion was
granted recently by the Court of Appeals.12 Actual publication will not
occur until after mandate is issued,129 and it is not uncommon for the
Supreme Court to order a Court of Appeals opinion withdrawn from
publication at the same time that it denies certiorari.' 30 Withdrawal
from publication by the Supreme Court eliminates any precedential or
persuasive force the opinion may officially have, save for res judicata, law
of the case, and collateral estoppel purposes. 131
D. Practice Before the Oklahoma Supreme Court
The time for filing a petition for certiorari expires twenty days after
the denial by the Court of Appeals of a petition for rehearing (if one is
filed) or (presumably) within twenty days of the filing of the Court of
Appeals opinion if no petition for rehearing is filed. Rule 3.14(G) of the
Rules on Practice and Procedure in the Court of Appeals and On Certio-
rari to That Court 132 expressly provides that the Supreme Court will not
extend this time limit. Although counsel should treat the twenty day
period as sacrosanct, cases continue to appear where a petition for certio-
rari was dismissed as untimely.13 3 Petitions for certiorari must be re-
ceived by the Supreme Court within the twenty day period in order to be
timely. 134
128. Cox v. B.F. Goodrich Co., No. 70,419 (Okla. Ct. App. 1989) (unpublished) (granting mo-
tion to publish original and supplemental opinions). The published opinions appear as Cox v. B.F.
Goodrich Co., 788 P.2d 967 (Okla. Ct. App. 1989).
129. Rule 1.200(C)(B), Rules of Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases. Under Rule 3.19 of the
Rules on Practice and Procedure in the Court of Appeals and On Certiorari to That Court, mandate
does not issue until there is no longer an opportunity for further review by either the Court of
Appeals or Supreme Court.
130. Recent examples include: Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. City of Oklahoma City, No. 68,160
(Okla. 1989) (unpublished); Moulson v. Kingfisher County Bd. of Tax Rolls Corrections, No. 69,226
(Okla. 1989); State ex reL Williams v. Midget, No. 67,565 (Okla. 1989); and Bryant v. El Gato
Drilling Co., No. 71,273 (Okla. 1989). For further discussion of this procedure, see Medina, supra
note 119, at 288-89.
131. Rule 1.200(B)(E), Rules of Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases.
132. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, ch. 15, app. 3 (1991).
133. See, eg., State ex rel. Roberts v. McDonald, 787 P.2d 466 (Okla. 1990) (certiorari dismissed
as untimely).
134. There is a gap in the new rules. The new rules do not specifically set forth the appropriate
time period for filing a certiorari petition when no petition for rehearing was filed in the Court of
Appeals. Conversations with the court staff indicate that twenty days from the date of filing of the
Court of Appeals decision would be the appropriate time period. See Rule 3.14(G) of the Rules on
Practice and Procedure in the Court of Appeals And On Certiorari to that Court. Rule 1.15(c) of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases provides: "All briefs, pleadings, motions, petitions
for rehearing, and petitions for certiorari to the Court of Appeals are deemed filed on date of receipt
of the Clerk of the Supreme Court." However, in Miller v. B.F. Goodrich Co., No. 69,636 (Sept. 25,
1989) (unpublished) (cited in Justice Opala's dissent in Bane v. Anderson, Bryant & Co., 786 P.2d
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Besides being timely filed, the petition for certiorari should also set
forth every question for which review is sought. The Supreme Court
ordinarily confines its review to the questions presented in the petition
for certiorari,13 although it also considers subsidiary questions that are
"fairly comprised" within the questions actually set forth in the
petition.
136
Lastly, the petition for certiorari must be accompanied by a $100
deposit for costs.' 3 v The requirement of the cost deposit for petitions for
certiorari was added in 1986,138 and the Oklahoma Supreme Court has
announced that it is enforcing the requirement by summarily dismissing
all petitions for certiorari that are fied without a cost deposit. 13 9 The
Supreme Court dismissed the petition for certiorari in Ingram v.
ONEOK, Inc.,"4 because the required cost deposit did not arrive before
the twenty day period for filing petitions for certiorari expired. Although
the Supreme Court decided that it did not have jurisdiction under article
7, section 5 of the Oklahoma Constitution, 141 because the cost deposit
was fied too late, it nevertheless assumed jurisdiction of the case pursu-
ant to its general superintending control conferred by article 7, section 4
of the Oklahoma Constitution.1 42 The Ingram case presented the issue of
1230, 1239 n.4 (Okla. 1989)), the Supreme Court accepted a petition for certiorari as timely that had
been mailed before expiration of the 20 day period for filing, but received afterwards. The Court had
earlier voted to dismiss the petition as untimely. Miller v. B.F. Goodrich Co., No. 69,636 (Okla.
1989) (unpublished).
135. Howell v. Ballard, 801 P.2d 127 (Okla. 1991); Ford v. Ford, 766 P.2d 950, 952 n.1 (Okla.
1989); Johnson v. Wade, 642 P.2d 255, 258 (Okla. 1982). Similarly, issues must be specified in the
petition in error in order to be subject to appellate review. Eg., Kirschstein v. Haynes, 788 P.2d
941, 954-55 (Okla. 1990) (issue not clearly set forth in petition in error is not properly before appel-
late court).
136. Rule 3.14(A)(3) of the Rules on Practice and Procedure in the Court of Appeals and On
Certiorari to That Court provides in pertinent part: "The statement of a question presented will be
deemed to include every subsidiary question fairly comprised therein. Only the questions set forth or
fairly comprised therein will be considered."
137. OKLA. STAT. tit. 20, § 30.4 (1991).
138. 1986 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 786, 799 (Vest).
139. Notice to the Bar, 60 Okla. B.J. 1996 (1990).
140. 775 P.2d 810, 812 (Okla. 1989).
141. OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 5 provides in pertinent part:
When the intermediate appellate courts acquire jurisdiction in any cause and make final
disposition of the same, such disposition shall be final and there shall be no further right of
appeal except for issuance of a writ of certiorari ordered by a majority of the Supreme
Court which may affirm, modify or make such other changes in said decision as it deems
proper.
Id.
142. OKLA. CONsT. art. VII, § 4 states in pertinent part:
The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend to a general superintending
control over all inferior courts and all Agencies, Commissions and Boards created by law.
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whether the statute of limitations for a newly created cause of action
under the Worker's Compensation Retaliatory Discharge Act was two or
three years. The Supreme Court based its unusual exercise of certiorari
on the urgency of the issue presented, the existence of an interdivisional
conflict on this issue among the panels of the Court of Appeals, and the
fact that its desired resolution did not afford relief to the tardy petitioner
for certiorari.143
The Oklahoma Supreme Court addressed the recovery of costs on
certiorari in a memorandum opinion in Sunrizon Homes, Inc. v. Ameri-
can Guaranty Investment Corporation.1" The court ruled that the suc-
cessful party may recover various fees imposed by statute, 145 but may not
recover the costs of copying briefs and petitions, except as authorized by
statute in divorce cases."46
CONCLUSION
With the Act's adoption and repeal, Oklahoma appellate procedure
has been undergoing fundamental change, and this change is likely to
continue for an additional period. Unfortunately, major change requires
adjustments and re-education, and generally it produces at least some
uncertainty and confusion. The latter have clearly accompanied the
Act's adoption and repeal, but eventually this will pass and be replaced
by an orderly system of appellate procedure. The discussion of the recent
judicial decisions in this area reveals that the Oklahoma Supreme Court
and Courts of Appeals approach procedural issues realistically and with
general due regard to the interests of justice. These courts can be
counted on to administer the appellate process fairly while it is being
remodeled.
143. Ingram, 775 P.2d at 812.
144. 782 P.2d 103, 109 (Okla. 1989).
145. These include a $100 appeal fee required by OKLA. STAT. tit. 20, § 15 (1991), a $100 certio-
rari fee required by OKLA. STAT. tit. 20, § 30.4 (1991), and a $30 record fee required by OKLA,
STAT. tit. 28, § 155.1 (1991).
146. Sunrizon Homes, 782 P.2d at 109.
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